This thesis is the first study to comprehensively evaluate the major theories of compellence by considering individual signals. An original data set compiled by surveying , archival documents catalogues every major military mobilization and verbal threat by the U.
President with compellent intent since strategic parity. The effect of international support for intervention is instructive: although associated with a higher rate of some concessions, international backing has no bearing on whether a target fully capitulates. Case studies of compellence prior to the First Gulf War and the Iraq War suggest that this phenomenon may be explained by the sequencing and expense of coalition building.
Ultimately, policymakers should consider that effective signaling is rare and that demonstrating an unflinching commitment to the use of force can backfire. The behavior of the Pakistan Army has been a central factor in that relationship. This thesis analyzes when, how and why the Pakistan Army has shifted its conventional military strategy in the post-Cold war era. Based on existing literature and interviews, this thesis argues that external threats, specifically those emanating from India and the U.
These findings can inform a calibrated US South Asia policy comprising the management of conventional military balance in nuclear South Asia. Abstract: Why do some states delegate cyber operations to proxies while others rely on central commands? This thesis explores state use of cyber proxies in light of principal-agent problems.
In particular, this work examines cyber proxies allegedly acting at the behest of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea by considering three variables: cost, skills and specialization, and plausible deniability. The use of case studies and process tracing analyses evaluate their explanatory power in the cyber realm. The data suggest that states may use cyber proxies to differing degrees and with differing motivations depending upon the type of mission or strategic aim, as well as their ability to pose credible threats to misbehaving proxies.
During a period of global uncertainty in which our everyday lives have been forced online, critical infrastructure, the public sector and private industry are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from adverse actors.
As data in this field improves, this thesis hopes to serve as a framework for future researchers to test, with more certainty, the causal links between these explanations and the use of cyber proxies within these four states.
Electoral Accountability and the All-Volunteer Force. Should that be the case, certain communities would pay higher costs of war while others would be relatively untouched, leaving the Executive free to command with little public accountability. This thesis adopts an experimental statistical counterfactual approach to examine the geographic casualty distribution across states during the Iraq War had there been a conscripted force.
The data presented suggest that the conventional logic is partially correct: an all-volunteer force is not egalitarian. It disproportionately burdened certain states—predominantly in the South and Midwest—with higher casualty rates than would have a conscripted force.
However, many of the states that shouldered the costs of war under an AVF also carry disproportionate political gravity as electoral swing states. These findings suggest that a President who chooses to use force is more likely to face electoral backlash for his or her decisions under an all-volunteer force than under a conscripted force.
Ultimately, the thesis proposes that President George W. Bush may have increased the margin of his victory in the Presidential election and contributed to greater Republican victories in the Senate election had the Iraq War been fought with a conscripted force that more equally distributed casualties.
For questions related to thesis-writing and research, please contact Dr. We also encourage you to speak to your academic advisor. Additionally, there is an information session in late January each year, which provides an opportunity for you to ask questions to faculty members, the teaching assistant, current students, and alumni. Those planning to co-term may apply to the honors program. Because of the significant time commitment involved, CISAC Honors students may find it difficult to participate in both a co-term degree and the honors program.
You are encouraged to carefully consider this time commitment before applying. Can I be in the program for a year other than my senior year such as junior year? Can the same person sign my consultation form and write my letter of recommendation? Please apply here for application components and instructions. Former Honors College Student Irene Kim explains, "I found that it was a perfect combination of my interest in international security and the opportunity to conduct a long-term research project that has policy implications in the future.
Our students are vibrant, engaged, and ready to tackle some of the world's most challenging problems in international security. Skip to: Skip to content Skip to navigation. Honors Program in International Security Studies.
Accepting applications Deadline: Feb 11, Apply now. Register now. Program Overview. In addition to policy-focused institutions like government bodies or think tanks, this can include work at corporations and technology companies engaged in international businesses with significant policy implications.
Course Requirements Succcessful completion of two courses is required as part of the honors conferral process. Honors Seminar Participation in the weekly honors seminar IIS throughout the academic year is required. Honors Thesis Students will engage in research and analysis producing an honors thesis at the end of senior year that makes a substantive contribution to the understanding of an international security issue. Those who apply without having taken the required courses will, if admitted, be required to complete the courses before graduation.
If need be, students may be enrolled in these required courses during their senior year, and can take one or more courses concurrently with the required Honors seminar. Have a minimum grade point average GPA of 3. Provide a letter of recommendation written by a Stanford faculty member or teaching assistant with whom the student has worked closely. Select at least one honors advisor who is a member of Stanford's Academic Council typically, a Professor of any level, a Senior Fellow, or a Center Fellow.
Students who wish to be advised by someone who is not a member of the Academic Council should also identify a co-advisor who is a member. This may or may not be the same faculty member who writes the recommendation letter. Complete a one-quarter policy relevant internship with a governmental office, international organization, or non-governmental organization directly involved in or engaged in work with implications for international security policy.
Internships may be completed before or during junior year. Before Harvard, he served as the director for plans and operations for cyber policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There, he worked closely with the Joint Staff and Cyber Command on a variety of efforts to counter malicious cyber activity against U.
Varun S. It's no surprise that he was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. It's very welcome news indeed that he is bringing his expertise to the Biden Administration.
The application deadline for the program year is February 12, Skip to: Skip to content Skip to navigation.
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